Now, it probably isn’t a secret that I am fundamentally opposed to Dennett’s proposal. It is doubly fair to qualify the following to be in response to this question: Why in the world did nature suddenly produce and select consciousness? (Context here)

To begin with, what do we take to be an adequate explanation or answer to that question? Obviously we aren’t going to exhaustively answer the most probing of questions on an unpopular blog run by pretentious jerks, but it’s fair to say that we can probably just intuit a good explanation from a bad one. A good explanation for why your sister is sick in bed could look something like- “Because she ate a homeless guy’s sock”. A bad explanation for why your sister is sick in bed could look something like- “Because she hasn’t gotten out of bed except to vomit”. The latter gives evidence for the claim that she is sick, whereas we are looking for an explanation of why this vomiting/sickness might be happening. This may seem like a ridiculous thing for me to elaborate on, but this confusion of ground and consequent is quite common. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve received an answer like “because evolution produced it!!1 lol” to the question “why did nature select consciousness for survival?”. Moving on…

Modularity theories of the mind generally posit at least some “modules” that process information internally and perform some functions without reference to other external systems (a global workspace or other modules). Before my dualist constituency jumps on this theory, I must confess that it is probably true in a limited sense. Perception is probably one of these modules. This appears to be a mandatory operation (key point) of the mind that is generally inaccessible to the conscious mind (whatever that is). In any case, Dennett is arguing for more than just a few modules in the brain that explain some functions of the mind. Rather, he would explain the entire illusion of the Cartesian Theater in terms of memes (read: his version of modules) which, of course, would explain the mind in terms of evolutionary mechanisms (which would answer my question with a punch to my realist face).

Or would it?

Admittedly, this sort of thinking is a step in the “right” direction for functionalists. But a step in the right direction does not necessarily mean that it is true or accounts for certain facts that I take to be basic to my belief structure. I have a few problems with Dennett’s modularity theory that capitalize on this realist sense that I have. For one, I don’t experience rough transitions in my consciousness. That is, if my mind is really a set of modules that is determined by the atomic-meme (a basic cultural unit) then I should think that my mind wouldn’t “flow”. However, something appears to tie all these different facets (modules) of my mind together, and what better candidate than a Cartesian Theater? To put it differently, there may very well be some modules, but continuity suggests something fluid and all-pervasive (a global workspace). Furthermore, memes themselves are not intrinsically meaningful. To quote Angus Menuge at length:

If memes are like atoms, then they can interpret neither themselves nor other memes, and must always behave in the same blind fashion. Yet, in the case of all proposed examples of memes, it is obvious that the interpretation of a meme makes a difference to how it behaves. Consider the candidate meme, “Just Do It.” While this phrase may have been successful in promoting mindless hedonism, we are all glad it has not influenced those in charge of nuclear missiles…The context defining a meme’s interpretation is crucial to whether it will influence action. But…this presupposes an interpreter with a point of view.

Angus Menuge, “Intelligent Design, Darwinism and Psychological Unity,” Philosophia Christi 10 (2008):126.

This brand of argumentation is commonly known as the “Unity of Consciousness Argument“. While I don’t claim to have said anything novel about the argument here, I do think that Dennett has completely missed the point of introducing memetics into modularity. Whether or not memetics is a serious, scientifically plausible (or useful) tool when it comes to the mind is left just as mysterious as before. At best, all Dennett has done is push the question back one further into something less tangible. Further, what are we really accomplishing given Dennett’s rather speculative theory? Despite it’s novelties, I’d say not much. Dennett wants to say that his memes provide all the firepower for our illusory Theater. But even if it did, does it solve the problems of endurance through time? Neverminding unity for a second, does it provide a reasonable account of rational mental states? His position, when coupled with his outlook on the natural (memetic) emergence of religion equates to something like:

D) Our mental content can be explained in virtue of our memetic history.

Unfortunately for Dennett, he belongs to the group “our” designates and is therefore subject to (D) the same as we theists are. So, either his memes explain our mental content (including his) or it does not. If it does, then the only reason Dennett believes what he does is because of memetic history. If not, then he has not explained our mental content. Either way, I’m not impressed with the proposal.

I think I’ll stick my realism concerning mental states for now.

It’s manifestly clear that although we have our noble threads, there’s a great darkness in the human heart, and injustice shines out of that watery matrix. What can be said of this? What can be done? Who among you has not wept in the face of the agony? Who among you has not been brokenhearted at the thought of a starving Ethiopian child? Which of you hasn’t felt weak to the knees on contemplating the situation in Darfur? Or the horrors of Nazi Germany? The Reaper’s eyes glare through the mists of time, and his bony hands clutch the ends of the earth. Death. Misery. Illness. Devastation. Burdens. The excruciating spiral down into madness.

We could turn to a thorough-going materialism, of course, in face of the terror. But as we gaze deeply into that, what does it bring? We are absolutely nothing but matter arranged in a certain fashion, with certain chemical processes marking us out from other arrangements of matter. Life is, ultimately, nothing but a distinctive feature of the chemical operations being exchanged. Nothing better or worse than any other manner of processes. No objective reason that “life” should be superior to its cessation. Nothing wrong with effecting the shift from one mode of functioning to another. Nothing wrong with killing. And for that matter, consciousness is entirely reducible to a particular exchange of impulses in the brain. Same for any particular variation on that, such as pain or pleasure. Nothing ethically distinct between inducing one or the other, or between consciousness and its alternatives. What, then, is wrong with the thought of a man lifting a weeping child and thrusting a short dagger into a growing belly, letting young entrails pour out onto the cold ground? That child’s pain is simply one manner in which matter can interact. And nothing higher exists to censure it and praise the alternative “action” of, say, giving bread to a malnourished beggar. It’s all just matter, and nothing more to tell, for materialism is inevitably reductionistic. Nothing ultimately different between what transpired in Auschwitz’s gas chambers and a speech about blessedness delivered in first-century Palestine by some insignificant Jewish preacher. Matter in action. Morality, a farce. Nothing but the combination of deterministic physical interactions and the occasional indeterministic quantum fluctuation. Certainly nothing teleological lying behind either, of course. And so no space for agent causality and other assorted myths like free will, moral responsibility, justice, freedom of choice, virtue, vice, and rational thought. And no hope for anything different in the future. Just a failed collection of biological specks. As Dogbert once quipped to Dilbert, “organic pain collector[s] hurtling towards oblivion”. So why feed the hungry? Why care at all for the sick? It’s neither better nor worse than, say, desecrating your great-grandfather’s grave, or depriving the needy to get another coin in your pocket, or depleting our natural resources with wanton abandon. For what does it matter if humanity lasts even another year? It makes no cosmic significance whether a nuclear Armageddon wipes out all life on earth next week. Our survival surely isn’t some objective good. There are no objective goods; they rest on the shoulders of teleology and intentionality. No difference between life and death, between perseverance and desperate suicide. No good, no evil. Just brute fact. Unexplainable and unexplained. No reason for hope.

Yet we live on. We act as if there is some deeper purpose behind it all, as if how we conduct ourselves matters. We have mental events distinct from brain events. We construct a hierarchy of goods, imposing it upon the realm of matter and function. We condemn the deeds of Dahmer and exult in the example of Gandhi. We almost universally press on, even through our darkest hours, even when it seems that our own personal hierarchy (pain is an evil to be avoided) conflicts with that perseverance. Others, of course, select death over pain or solitude. But, by and large, we see continuation as a good that, even combined with that pain, secures a positive net entry into our little mental notation. We have hope. We behave as though minds genuinely exist, and as though moral responsibility is a true aspect of mortal life. We instinctively know that things are not as materialistic reductionism would lead us to perceive. We know better.

There is, of course, a perspective far more consonant with what we immediately perceive. There’s a world that includes mental substances and mental events, things not reducible to the merely material. Things not wholly determined by physical events. There is moral responsibility. There is objective wrong and objective right. Our reasoning faculties are not just interacting particles and chemical signals; they are also mental events that can fit together in a logically coherent whole. We can look at Auschwitz and rightly condemn; we can look at Mother Theresa and rightly praise. And this is reasonable. But there is still something horribly wrong. Something sinister at the core. For, as before, we see that extremities of good and evil reside within us. Great virtue, great vice. The former is no problem, we like that… but what of this latter, this grotesque inclination that erupts in violence and degradation?

Perhaps there is an answer. Something higher, a source for this abundant teleology. A reason why death is bad and life is good. A fundamental ground that serves as the originator of mental substances that are seemingly conjoined unexpectedly with matter. Call this what you will. But perhaps in such a postulate, if it be true, there is cause for hope.

Some think so. Some tell a sweeping saga about a love. It concerns, you see, the Teleology Provider expressing great distress over the way things have gone, and so there is invasion. The schizophrenic world received visitation like no other. An Untainted One felt our filthy touch and reached out fearlessly with spotless hands of His own. A power was promised, a power was offered. Grime of the heart, soaked in the blood of perfect life. A new people, snatched from old ways, living in the interim between two eras. A community, bound together by bloodshed offered freely. And an infinite force taking up residence among the members as though in a sanctuary. Of course, there’s still that thorny matter of the in-between, the paradox. But in that, there’s a promise. Now is partial; then shall be full. A new age, the new age. Perfection comes. Justice done, death undone. A banquet for the hungry, flowing water for the thirsty. Wealth for the destitute, new robes for the naked. Wholeness for the broken. Tears a moist memory. Violence gone; no more violation, no more shame. The new people, the temple people, the community, blessed for a new age. Healing. Hope for the helpless, rest for the weary, love for a broken heart. Mercy and grace, might and pardon. All because of an invasion, ferried in by the Untainted One who took stains from the stained.

That’s at least how the narrative goes. So many stories. Some hopeful, some fearful. I’ve told two. One wretched to the core, painted with blood at its very foundation. Not even reason survives its touch. Nearly every basic belief is called into question or outright denied, though most back away from its darker, deeper corridors. Another also has blood at its foundation. But not mine, and not yours. God’s. It offers hope and encourages truth, reason, and virtue. It displays standards by which to truly evaluate acts.

I know which story solves a very real problem, and which story reduces the problem into insignificant brute reality at the expense of every value anyone has ever held. I know which story tells me that I should be dismayed at evil and overjoyed at good. I know which story tells me to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, tend to the wounded, and comfort the hurting. I know which story enables and unlocks true humanity, if only we’ll be saturated by the epic. I know which story speaks of change, and which one speaks of dreadful stasis.

Which story do you tell?

1. Immaterial minds do not fit with the emerging picture of the physical world. Science keeps peering further into the nature of previously mysterious areas and gives us a causal account of things explicable in terms of physical goings-on.

I have to admit that, although we are left without a specific objection here, this one probably makes the dualist quiver the most. It was a combination of this kind of objection coupled with the arguments for the non-identity of mental states to brain-states that drove me into the arms of Emergent Dualism. However, this objection ought not to level anyone’s belief about the mind as long as they have significant reasons for rejecting reductionistic accounts.

2. Evolution would’ve had to produce immaterial minds somewhere along the lines of our lineage which seems improbable/inexplicable. How and when would this have happened?

Actually, I would extend this objection to non-dualists as well- why in the world did nature suddenly produce and select consciousness? Isn’t that something just as mysterious? Unless naturalists can provide a reason for the existence of consciousness, they are left gasping for explanation. Further, most dualists are not just dualists about philosophy of mind but of explanations as well. To elaborate a bit, we explain phenomena not just in terms of physical laws (of selection, genetics and neurobiology, for instance) but of teleology. Nature and her laws are here to produce some kind of effect; namely, consciousness. Therefore, we will not exhaust an explanation of the mind by recourse to physical history of biological entities (even though such a history is important).

3. How can minds interact in space-time if they are immaterial?

One can then ask, how does matter interact with other matter? What is causation, and what exactly allows the causal relation between physical entities? The point being, there is no formal contradiction in saying that immaterial minds and material bodies interact with each other. It may be mysterious, but no more mysterious than the nature of causation or physical relations.

4. There must be some kind of exchange of energy if the mind is to interact with the body (laws of conservation and so on).

To be honest, I don’t get this objection. We do not understand the mind very much at all yet, so it is difficult to speak with any kind of force to this issue. There are possible answers to this questions, however. There could be some kind of psychic energy (which I think has been put forward by John Eccles), or perhaps “holes” in the laws of conservation via Quantum Mechanics, or maybe we do not live in a closed system and so the mind would introduce new “energy” into our system without violating said laws. Further, our thinking on the matter may be entirely egregious at the moment considering our vastly small understanding of the physical world. In other words, I take a wait-and-see approach with this last objection.

The only practical method [to go about treating the wide ranging, variable-quality evidence] is to use the data we have not as sure indications of motive in individual instances, but as clues to how observers expected things to work; that is, to treat all the evidence as a kind of fiction, but as fiction that gives the historian legitimate insights into norms and broader realities. So this is an investigation of political culture rather than political history; the aim is not to discover why individual events occurred, but (ideally) to discover how a whole political world worked by studying how a range of people expected it to work. (p.28 )

So, while he uses texts that are mostly unhistorical, “largely invention,” the goal is not to resurface with a historical account but an understanding of the cultural forces that moved people. This does not mean, as he takes the time to say in many ways, that the second century BC and the second century AD are the same or that the writers have identical views, or even that the authors in the same generation have identical views. It is merely his sample and his research goal has already been stated.

I’ll eventually make a long post about methods, but let’s get to the two stories I want to share. I came across some salient illustrations of honor and I’ll be sure to pick out a bunch for later. These are short ones.

Let me remind you that honor is about prestige, respect, reputation–all done through public acts, all done with the perception of others in mind. To defer to someone was to show them proper honor or to honor them (depending on your relative status). To be praised by an honorable man was to be honored. On it goes, with endless examples of honoring and dishonoring.

1. There is a Latin word for a kind of honor that can have an utterly compulsive force, maiestas. Cato the Younger left a theatre in the middle of a performance, and his maiestas was so great that everyone else got up and left with him. (p.59)

2. Scipio Nasica headed a large group of senators in a rush to kill Tiberius Gracchus. According to Plutarch, bystanders were so compelled to move out of their way that they trampled themselves. They were compelled “because of the worthiness of the men.” This, says Lendon, is “action in the face of distinction” (p.61).

I admit I find these stories fairly humorous. At the same time I can imagine it in modern terms. A high profile critic whose opinion has immense sway, leaves a show in disgust and others who either do not want to disrespect her opinion or disagree, leave accordingly. But the similarities are thin and the imaginary is devoid of the tones of honor that are integral to understanding the forces in the story.

Before I continue I should post some comments about methodology. I find that these are required since most people do not have familiarity with socio-cultural exegesis. In response to someone who read my post as an apologist straining to justify atrocities an outdated text written by ignorant primitives, I wrote,

I’m actually not arguing that it is “justified”… nor am I focusing on using bears per se. Rather I am attempting to do a close reading of the text, using ethnographic material to provide interpretive trajectories, and seeing where that takes us. If you look at the end of my post I provide no conclusion but actually try to think critically about what I’ve gone through. My main interest in exploring this passage was in terms of a social-science perspective. I would like to be mistaken in my reading since that invites me to learn more. When it comes to moral justification I think one should include discussion of a standard or philosophy, which I have not done. I also do not, as someone implied, try to demonstrate that this narrative is “historically accurate.”

Let us continue.

Among other things, I looked at Glen Miller’s piece which put down some insightful comments (cf. Holding’s article here). However I was not really satisfied with some of the comments. Miller did not discuss anything relating to the processes by which a mocking group could form, except for a reference to gangs from Gleason Archer (!), and he also did not discuss gossip networks which I suspected to be quite key in understanding the incident. In Holding’s article he cites Callahan as saying there is “nothing in the actual story to justify” Archer’s gang reference, and Holding’s reply points to the necessary reciprocial group relations required for survival, suggesting that they were essentially bandits. I think Archer is somewhat correct although quite lacking, and I don’t think Holding’s explanation of bandits is the best one for the mocking group although it certainly gives insight. (Why would bandits stop to mock?)

As you might have guessed I’d like to explore those topics here. I’m not going to cite much so you’ll have to ask for references. To the passage:

From [Jericho] Elisha went up to Bethel. As he was walking along the road, some youths came out of the town and jeered at him. “Go on up, you baldhead!” they said. “Go on up, you baldhead!” He turned around, looked at them and called down a curse on them in the name of the LORD. Then two bears came out of the woods and mauled forty-two of the youths. And he went on to Mount Carmel and from there returned to Samaria.
(2 Kn 2:23-25, NIV)

Here again are the two questions I had:
- What factors played into the honor-challenge?
- How could a fairly large group of people form with the apparently sole intent to mock?

Let’s start with the honor-challenge. First, Elisha appears to be travelling. He is not inside a city when this happens, but he may be nearing or entering Bethel. I am going to assume for now that Holding’s banditry explanation is wrong and I’ll argue that later. I think that the group of people are coming out of Bethel. That means he is close enough for gossip to spread and people to be gathered. This sets the stage for a typical honor-challenge situation since it requires a very public arena. The crowd, too, as I will argue, is definitely larger than the number of people attacked/killed, and it would not be unsurprising to find that the majority of males of Bethel were present. (Why males? Public space as well as males being the upholders of family honor. Family honor seems to be mostly a intra-village issue but for reasons I’ll explore later, it seems that people would temporarily set aside specific intra-village issues to defend the inter-village reputation. The importance of village reputation would have been understood.)

A couple textual elements help focus the challenge. In the opening verses of ch.2, Elisha is granted Elijah’s prophetic office. We see “the prophets” sort of pestering Elisha, asking if he knows his master is going to be taken away. Elisha claims to know (insider status) but tells them–or asks them?–not to say it. Honor, again, is a profoundly public issue. Labels are “easily” given and Elisha’s reply may be guarding against any new nickname relating to being taken up. Imagine: Elisha, servant of the one who was taken up (i.e. not here).

Elisha also was referred to as “our lord” at Jericho and acted in Elijah’s god’s name. We have then two aspects to help us locate Elisha’s honor rating: he ‘inherited’ his master Elijah’s reputation and prophetic office, and he more or less gained clients for Elijah’s god.

Now, I may have missed something between 1 Kings 12and 2 Kings 2,but in 1 Kings 12-13we find that Bethel is turned into a city of cult worship (btw: no derogatory connotations attached to “cult” as I use it):

Jeroboam thought to himself, “The kingdom will now likely revert to the house of David. If these people go up to offer sacrifices at the temple of the LORD in Jerusalem, they will again give their allegiance to their lord, Rehoboam king of Judah. They will kill me and return to King Rehoboam.” After seeking advice, the king made two golden calves. He said to the people, “It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem. Here are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of Egypt.” One he set up in Bethel, and the other in Dan. . . He instituted a festival on the fifteenth day of the eighth month, like the festival held in Judah, and offered sacrifices on the altar. This he did in Bethel, sacrificing to the calves he had made. And at Bethel he also installed priests at the high places he had made. On the fifteenth day of the eighth month, a month of his own choosing, he offered sacrifices on the altar he had built at Bethel. So he instituted the festival for the Israelites and went up to the altar to make offerings.
(1 Kings 12:26-29, 32-33)

I include the mention of the festival because, well, to be really simplistic, festivals order time. If anyone has been reading modern Catholic theology or grew up in a traditional Orthodox setting they can probably appreciate the reality-shaping powers of time-ordering events far better than the rest of us liturgically deprived Prots.

In addition to the festival the other thing to note is that the gods that Jerobam set up are not equivalent to Elijah’s god. We see, then, the sort of total reality-ordering aspects that would put Bethel at odds with Elisha: time, religion, and politics are ordered in a different way. And since family is what encompasses these three aspects, we may quite safely say that Jerobam’s changes effected a new reality in Bethel (and Dan).

This amplifies points 3-5 made by Miller, and is why I wouldn’t be surprised if the majority of men from Bethel were present at Elisha’s mocking. Elisha, a prophet of another god who just increased his honor at Jericho, would be a threat to the new reality. I will further amplify this reading in a moment.

As for the specific honor-challenge, I think the first part does refer to Elijah’s ascension. Someone suggested to me that they may have been challenging him to sacrifice to their gods, but no argument was given and I don’t know how one could argue for that interpretation. Note that prophets from Bethel and Jericho seemed to know about it and even the specific “taken up” aspect (2 Kn 2:16): news spreads.

Speaking of which I want to explore gossip networks a little. Don’t worry I’m not going to hit you with five pages of ethnographic material.

A gossip network is the set of connections between some population through which information travels and evaluative judgments are made. Or to put it another way, it has multiple functions with the main function being the re/shaping and strengthening of the community’s moral code. Let’s look at some Spanish terms from an Andalusian village:

1. criticar. to criticize. rough equiv of Eng term ‘gossip’
2. rajar. to cut. with a clear intention to harm
3. darle la lengua. to tongue lash. a sustained campaign of vilification
4. cuchichear. to whisper. uninformed talk
5. murmurar. to murmur. informed talk
6. chismorear. to speak of trifles. harmless exchange of info
7. paliquear. to chatter or talk idly of nothing. often with sexual undertones
8. cortar el traje. to cut the cloth. idle talk without malice–entertainment
9. charlar. to chat. a euphemism for criticar
10. hablar occulto. to speak secretly. secret talk about those in power
11. contar. to tell. to betray a confidence; hence the worse form of gossip

We can see, then, many different kinds of words for different forms of gossip. Rohrbaugh listed a fairly large mass from both Testaments (see Social-Scientific Models for Interpreting the BIble). Now, the “go on up” reference quite clearly falls under number 7, as Elisha was indubitably a highly attractive man who was so accosted by infatuated male youth that….. uhhh nevermind.

Initially we may taken the honor-challenge to be described by #2, but I think there’s a good case to be made for #3 as well. I think the variety of terms relating to different forms of gossip must be paired with a good structural understanding, but for now let’s just take it as suggestive of the consciousness of communication that honor-shame groups would have. We are also conscious of gossip but not commonly in a way that could threaten another person’s standing in the community and therefore livelihood. But analogies to our own context can be explored later.

Now, I found a story about a mocking group that, when combined about things we know about ancient travel and security, offers some good interpretive trajectories. And that story is the vito of 1930. This comes from Julian Pitt-Rivers’ The people of Sierra, which is more or less an ethnography about a rural Spanish village. A vito is basically “an aggressive outburst of ridicule”.

A fellow called Jacinto el Conte was on the receiving end of one such vito. His initial offense was two-fold. The more significant one was deserting his wife and children; the other offense was setting up a house with an unmarried woman, one that already had a bad reputation. In response to this dual offense, over two hundred people from his village came. What is especially significant about this crowd is that it wasn’t simply young men that came. Married men also showed up, further demonstrating the pervasive displeasure of the village. The crowd sang lewd and insulting songs, rang bells, and blew horns. It was a mock fest. (Please understand that the songs are an especially shameful form of insult because they are more memorable: the shame endures!)

Jacinto defied the village’s censure by calling in the Civil Guard to dispell the group. The Guard came and arrested many people, but the people kept coming. They escalated the fest by bringing a large bell, one that required two men to carry. The Guard took away the bell. The people kept coming. The Guard eventually gave up, and the people took that as a victory, reenergizing the fest.

Jacinto attempted to dissuade the mockers by moving farther away from the village, but still the people kept coming. In fact people from another nearby village began to come. Among the other things they did, they baked mud figures with horns, and put them in places where Jacinto would find them during the day. They also wired his door shut, stuck a shotgun through the window hatch and sang songs into the house. This vito went on for three months until Jacinto died of a heart attack. So goes the most famous vito of 1930.

Pitt-Rivers offers five characteristics of the vito:

1. It is done in response to a direct challenge to the group’s moral code. (In this case, deserting his wife and children and setting up a house with an unmarried woman with a bad reputation.)
2. It can be habitual. (They knew where Jacinto lived.)
3. It is an aggressive outburst of ridicule. (Often these songs are as personal as possible.)
4. There is typically no violence attached. (There need not be: the whole event is very shaming.)
5. It is typically done under the cover of night. (Typically the mockers would be young men, who would be interested in concealing their identities as well as keeping themselves safe.)

Pitt-Rivers also tells of other mock fests that resolve peacefully or were not serious to begin with. Still, the collective action and violent potential of the 1930 vito makes for a better comparative case. Taking this mock fest as a model, let’s look back to Elisha and see what interpretive trajectories there are.

Elisha occupies a prophetic office of a god that differs from the one in Bethel. He had just dispelled the curse at Jericho in the name of Elijah’s god. Therefore Elisha constitutes a direct challenge to the group’s moral code: they will not suffer this prophet. In response to his coming, word spreads around the village and a crowd is formed. (In some respects it is like an alternative ending of the parable of the prodigal: the village gathers to shame and even kill the son.)

In the vito, the Civil Guard was called in to dispell the group. They arrested some but not all. This greatly amplifies Miller’s point #5: if 42 were attacked/killed, there must have been a far greater amount of people to begin with.

The act of calling in the Civil Guard was an act of defiance, of rejecting the village’s judgment. Clearly Elisha does the same with his curse. Given the pol/rel context, the village of Bethel was also challenging the reality and power of Elijah’s god. According to 2 Kings, they received memorable evidence.

This reading, I think, is better than Holding’s banditry explanation. Bethel, ‘ruled’ by another god, collectively challenges Elisha. Holding asks, “why were they not at home contributing to the corporate survival of their own families?” The interpretive trajectory that answers his question is that they were, actually, contributing to group survival by running this prophet-threat into a nothingness of shame.

Let’s return to the gang reference by Archer (Miller’s point #6). In the vito, the Civil Guard was called in, indicating a functional external controller of civil order. This sort of external agent did not exist, and Elisha facing up to a hostile city was indeed in trouble. It would not be guaranteed that his death would have resulted in retribution from anyone, and indeed with a challenge to his god’s power, his death would easily be taken as evidence that his god indeed was not powerful.

I think there are issues with the readings I have offered. One of them is that in 2 Kings 2,Elijah and Elisha go to Bethel and are not (at least it is not recorded) accosted. For whatever reason, the prophets at Bethel go to Elisha (NOT his master!). I am curious to know if there is significance in the line, “The company of the prophets at Bethel came out to Elisha” as opposed to “The company of the prophets at Jericho went up to Elisha”–the first could mean that they came out of the city (= into area not bounded by the group) and the second simply that they went to ask him. One explanation is that the prophets at Bethel held functional respect for Elijah, who after all had defeated prophets of Baal in 1 Kings 18. The prophets of Bethel were not (?) present for Elijah’s ascension or Elisha’s ‘inheritance’ of the prophetic office, only the prophets of Jericho were (cf. vv.4-18).

So, the question remains… are we ultimately self-determining, meaning that we have the free moral ability to choose Him and based upon this choice of Him, God “elects” us? (It doesn’t seem to me like God is choosing anything here, but that He is just acknowledging our choice to come to Him.)

Or, is God ultimately self-determining… meaning that according to His sovereign election He chooses some to salvation according to His electing Grace?

First off, I would like to point out that even this apparently Calvinist notices the deep-seated connection between freedom and moral responsibility- …we have the free moral ability…. That, to me, is a fairly stunning and refreshing admission (whether or not the author views it as an admission is another issue). Second, I really have no idea what the word sovereignty means anymore. I hear it used all the time, and when I confront divine-determinists about it they usually retort that it means that God is in control. Thank goodness we aren’t ambiguous. For me, it comes down to this: does God cause all that happens? If not, then what does He cause? Does He cause calamity, faith, sin? Does he micromanage or does He sit back unconcerned? Is there a possible middle route?

I tend to think that God does not cause everything in the truest sense of the word cause, though He does often contribute to “causes” and provides the necessary conditions for us to do things. Take salvation for example. We certainly aren’t searching for God prior to salvation. God uses his drawing power and grace to put us in a salvific situation. Does God cause us to be saved? Doubt it. If so, then I have some questions:

*Why not save everyone? God appears to want all to be saved.
*Why the show? Let’s just end all this pain and suffering and take the elect the heaven and send the un-elect to hell.
*Why tease the unelect? Doesn’t appear to be much use in badgering those He never elected with offers of salvation.

Anyway, I think that words like “sovereignty” and “control” are more or less useless, and should be left out of this particular debate.

Since possible worlds express a “picture” in a way that propositions do (and this will be your position unless you subscribe to modal concretism, I think) then (2) appears to be uncontroversial.

Click here

In an influential essay, S. M. Baugh has attempted to rescue Rom 8:29 and similar texts for Reformed theology by arguing that the meaning of foreknowledge in the NT renders “impossible” the “Arminian notion of ‘foreseen faith’ … as an interpretation of God’s knowledge” when foreknowledge concerns predestination.1 He vigorously objects to the common Arminian interpretation-to Baugh such readings of Scripture import theology into the meaning of the sacred texts in a way that does unconscionable violence to them.2

Aware that his basic position appears to enjoy widespread support among recent and contemporary Calvinist theologians,3 we challenge Baugh’s conclusions. In this essay, we look first at Baugh’s word studies and the conclusions he draws from them. We then focus attention on the work that these conclusions are called to do for his theology, and we argue that he has not made a convincing case that the Arminian interpretation is “impossible.” Noting that Baugh tends to conflate exegetical and logical issues, we find Baugh’s arguments to be both unclear and unpersuasive; we conclude that he has not closed the door to the Arminian view of foreknowledge and predestination.

C. Concepts are mental effects
A. Propositions are concepts
N. Some propositions exist necessarily
.: ₁ Some concepts exist necessarily
.: ₂ Minds exist necessarily (where mind is defined as that which produces mental effects)

He defends each premise quite ably, but I think that if one is tempted towards conceptualism they will have a tough time escaping the conclusion that God exists. I recently came in possession of a book by Hartry Field defending fictionalism, so perhaps I’ll offer a few thoughts on the subject once I make my way through the book.

I do not really like apologetics because in the six or so years I’ve been involved with it and similar discussions, I find that an attack/defense framework often polarizes discussions to the point where fellow human beings cannot state the positive aspects of their opponent’s arguments.  I also am frequently sympathetic to non- and anti-Christian thought.  My role here is to aid, in the areas I can (social-scientific criticism), any genuine investigation.  Josh and JB are fine folk and I am glad to post with them.

Bronze